Working Papers

The Optimal Level of Consultation (Job Market Paper)

• Abstract:  This paper studies how an information seller optimally manages information quality to maximize revenue from a client who purchases costly consultation before making an irreversible decision. I analyze this problem using a continuous time principal-agent model where the agent learns about a binary state through a drift--diffusion process whose precision is chosen by the principal. I find that in order to maximize revenue, the principal provides the worst information to the agent who’s the most uncertain about which action to take, i.e. when the prior is near indifference between actions. By offering worse signals, the principal prolongs engagement and increases revenue. This prediction can be tested in many empirical settings where experts or digital platforms supply tailored information to users who hold heterogeneous priors.

Work in Progress

Learning From Your Neighbors 

Course Instructor 

• ECON 101: Microeconomic Theory - 2024 Summer (Rating: 8.25/9.00)